Washington Legislation—1941 by O\u27Bryan, J. Grattan et al.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 16 Number 2 
4-1-1941 
Washington Legislation—1941 
J. Grattan O'Bryan 
University of Washington School of Law 
Leslie J. Ayer 
University of Washington School of Law 
Judson F. Falknor 
University of Washington School of Law 
Warren L. Shattuck 
University of Washington School of Law 
John B. Sholley 
University of Washington School of Law 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. G. O'Bryan, Leslie J. Ayer, Judson F. Falknor, Warren L. Shattuck, John B. Sholley & John W. Richards, 
Washington Legislation, Washington Legislation—1941, 16 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 59 (1941). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol16/iss2/1 
This Washington Legislation is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW 
Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Washington Legislation—1941 
Authors 
J. Grattan O'Bryan, Leslie J. Ayer, Judson F. Falknor, Warren L. Shattuck, John B. Sholley, and John W. 
Richards 





VOLUME XVI APRIL, 1941 NUMBER 2
WASHINGTON LEGISLATION -1941*
The enactments of the Twenty-Seventh Legislature of the State of
Washington, statistically speaking, establish no records. The 253 chap-
ters finally approved have been exceeded in number not only by the
output of the 1937 legislature (315 chapters) but also as long ago as
1907 by the Tenth Legislature which added 256 acts to the statute
law of the state. In bulk measured by pri*nted pages the 1941 enact-
ments, which take up 928 pages, are overshadowed by the 1937 volume
of 1228 pages and, interestingly, by those of the 1909 session which
filled 1030 pages of considerably smaller print than that now used.
As to subject matter a rough analysis shows that approximately
two-thirds of the acts approved are concerned with the delineation of
powers, duties and activities of the state, its boards and commissions
and officers, and of the various political subdivisions of the state. The
next largest group of enactments, which however is but slightly more
than a fifth of the total number, is of the type which may be desig-
nated regulatory, that is, which in one way or another affect the con-
duct of citizens of the state in either their personal or business activi-
ties. Of these regulatory statutes one-half are modifications of existing
statutory regulations, and the balance (28 in nuniber) establish stand-
ards of conduct hitherto not dealt with by statute. The following
tabulation shows the general character of the legislative product:
Powers, duties, etc., of governmental agencies:
In general -----------.-.----------------.-.-.------.-.-.- ......... ------.--- --- 123
Appropriations ---------------------------------------------  13
Taxation .......................................................................... 23 159
Regulating individual and corporate conduct:
O riginal ------------------- .-.-- ... ------- . . - . . ...........------------ - 28
Amendatory -----------.-.----.................-----------------------------.--- 29 57
Rcpealing existing statutes ----------------------------------------------------- - 13
Courts and legal procedure ----------.-..............................--------- 12
Labor and social security ------- .................------------------------------- 12
Total ............................................................-------- -------- .............. 253
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
In undertaking to survey the work of the 1941 legislature the aim has
not been to attain complete coverage. Space limitations and the time
factor have dictated that only certain phases be considered and that
brevity rather than complete analysis be the guide. In selecting topics
for discussion the aim has been to give attention to those statutes
which are likely to be of greatest concern to practicing lawyers. At the
outset this meant that virtually all of the largest group of statutes,
those dealing with the powers of governmental units, be eliminated. Of
the remaining statutes all could not be discussed, or even mentioned,
and while the selection has been arbitrary the attempt has been to focus
upon those which appear to be of the most general interest. Special
regard has been had for statutes affecting judicial procedure, to those
of a regulatory character and to social legislation. Because of space
and time limitations consideration of some material has necessarily
been postponed until the next issue of the REVIEW. Among the statutes
which will be discussed in the later issue are those dealing with agricul-
ture, banking, small loans, taxation, trusts, and workmen's compensa-
tion.
The survey has been a cooperative enterprise by the members of the
law faculty of the University of Washington, with the valuable help
of members of the student editorial board of the REVIEw. In particular,
Dean Falknor was assisted by Mr. Arthur Quigley. Mr. Robert Buck
aided Professor O'Bryan. Professor Shattuck had the assistance of Mr.
Herbert Droker, and Professor Sholley, of Mr. Snyder Jed King and
Mr. Bayard Crutcher.
The comment upon Initiative No. 141, prepared by Mr. Vern Coun-
tryman, published in this issue, is also a part of the general project.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Costs on Appeal. Our statutes now include provision for allowance
of costs to the prevailing party upon applications to the supreme
court for original writs other than writs of habeas corpus.' This makes
statutory the holding of an early case under the old act.2 The new
act reads "irrespective of any costs to be taxed . . . below," while the
old act did not include the phrase "to be." It is doubtful if the addi-
tion is of any significance.
Justice Courts. Companion bills' were introduced in the legisla-
ture to change the election of justices of the peace from precincts to
towns and cities, to define anew jurisdiction, and to eliminate the
'L. '41, ch. 86, § 1, amending REM. REv. STAT. § 1744.
State ex rel. Terminal Co. v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 453, 82 Pac. 878 (1905)
(attorney's fees of $15.00 allowed on writ of certiorari). The present amendment
allows $25.00 attorney's fees on writs, conforming to the usual fee on appeal.
' House Bills No. 134 and No. 292.
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country justice. For some reason, only the bill specifying where ac-
tions should be commenced passed.4 Thus, we have justices elected by
precincts, yet under the new act "every justice of the peace elected in
any city or town shall hold court . . .". Can the justice elected in a
country precinct still hold court? The new act eliminates the right to
bring an action in the precinct where one or more of the defendants
reside, and requires that the action be commenced in the city or town
in which one or more of the defendants reside. Where the defendant
does not reside in a town of 1,000 inhabitants or more, the action
may be started in either of the two nearest incorporated cities or
towns or in the county seat. The courts will decide whether the coun-
try justice has been stripped of power to entertain and determine cases.
Publications. An amendment provides that publications required by
law can now be published only in a newspaper which has been ap-
proved by an order of the superior court of the county in which the
paper is published.5 The newspaper must have the statutory require-
ments six months before it can be certified. Formerly, the paper must
have had the requirements six months before the publication in ques-
tion. An affidavit of publication must now state that the newspaper has
been properly certified.
Sheriffs' Indemnity Bonds. A sheriff or levying officer may require an
indemnifying bond of the plaintiff where he has to take possession of
personal property. This amendment merely codifies the universal prac-
tice and makes certain the sheriff's right to indemnity.
Venue. The venue statute will now include under the causes to be
tried in the county where the cause arose "recovery of damages aris-
ing from a motor vehicle accident.' 7 Plaintiffs are expressly given the
option of venue either where the accident occurred or where one or
more of the defendants reside. Previously, the venue was at the de-
fendant's residence, necessitating an application for change of venue to
the place of the accident on the ground of convenience of witnesses.
The amendment is the result of a recommendation by the Judicial
Council prompted by judicial recognition of hardships to plaintiffs
under the old act.
Affidavits of Prejudice. The old statute is amended in two particu-
lars.8 In counties where there is but one resident judge, the motion
must be filed not later than the day on which the case is called to be
set for trial. This will eliminate expense incurred by calling a jury and
other court officers only to find an affidavit of prejudice on the day of
'L. '41, ch. 89, amending REm. REV. STAT. §§ 43, 47, 1756, 1757.
'L. '41, ch. 213, amending REm. REV. STAT. §§ 253-1,2,3, 5.
6L. '41, ch. 237, § 1, amending L. '35, 6h. 33, § 1; Ras. REV. STAT. § 4172.
L. '41, ch. 81, § 1, amending REm. REv. STAT. § 205.8 L. '41, ch. 148, amending REi. REv. STAT. § 209-2.
1941]
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the trial. The one-judge courts often had to adjourn for lack of busi-
ness. The new act has further provided "That notwithstanding the
filing of such motion and affidavit, if the parties shall, by stipulation
in writing agree, such Judge may hear argument and rule upon any
preliminary motions, demurrers, or other matter thereafter presented."
Apparently this applies to all counties, and seems to be a desirable
amendment as it allows the judge, with the consent of the parties, to




Chapter 103 of the 1941 session laws, relating to insolvent corpora-
tions with respect to preferences, is a definite modification of the trust
fund doctrine as heretofore established both by case law and the stat-
utes of 1931.'
Section 1 of the act comprises definitions for "receiver," "date of ap-
plication," and "preference." Primarily, these definitions make more
specific sections 1 and 2(a) of chapter 47 of the session laws of Wash-
ington for 1931, which chapter 47, by the way, was expressly repealed
by this act. "Receiver" as now used includes "common law assignee,"
not used in the former act. "Date of application" now includes ap-
pointments of receivers without court proceedings. "Preference" is
given as a general definition and is no longer limited to a four months'
period as in the prior act.
Section 2 re-enacts section 1 of chapter 47, supra.
Section 3 in its explicit and clear provisions makes a vital change
in the law and should do much to clear away confusion heretofore
existing. It modifies and practically does away with the trust fund
doctrine applicable to corporations as it heretofore existed in the State
of Washington. It more closely approximates the federal rule in
bankruptcy.
Prior to 1931, the trust fund doctrine as it existed in this state per-
mitted the setting aside of preferences regardless of whether or not
received with reasonable cause to believe that it was a preference.2
The act passed in 1931, entitled "Preferences of Insolvent Corpora-
tions," 3 as construed by subsequent decisions, 4 changed the former rule
by providing that preferences could be set aside only in the event that
'Zettler, The Trust Fund Theory (1925) 1 WASH. L. Rxv. 81; L. '31, ch. 47;
R1m. Rv. STAT. § 5831.
2 Post v. Fischer, 191 Wash. 577, 71 P. (2d) 659 (1937); Meier v. The Com-
mercial Tire Co., 179 Wash. 449, 38 P. (2d) 383 (1934); Sterrett v. White Pine
Sash Co., 176 Wash. 663, 30 P. (2d) 665 (1934); Jensen v. American Bank of
Spokane, 157 Wash. 240, 288 Pac. 660 (1930) and cases cited.
L. '31, ch. 47; Ras. REv. STAT. § 5831.
See note 2, supra.
[VOL. 16
CORPORATIONS
they were received with reasonable cause to believe a preference was
being given when received, within four months before the filing of an
application for the appointment of a receiver. Seemingly, the act made
the knowledge test applicable to any preference whether before or
within the four months' period. But it was held in Post v. Fischer5
that good faith within the four months' period would not protect the
preferred creditor. Accordingly, in this holding the rule does not fol-
low the bankruptcy rule and the state law will govern.6
These problems are definitely settled by section 3 of the present
act. A preference before the four months' period cannot be set aside,
knowledge or no knowledge. A preference within the four months'
period can be set aside, knowledge or no knowledge.
Other sections make minor modifications.7 Section 7 expressly re-
peals section 57 of chapter 185 of the Laws of 1933 (the Uniform
Corporation Act), re-enacts section 57(a) and omits section 57(b) of
the former section 57. This probably is to make certain that the
bankruptcy rules shall not apply so far as the substantive law is con-
cerned as discussed and held by Justice Blake in Post v. Fischer, supra.
The amendment may also possibly do away with the distinction be-
tween statutory proceedings for dissolution and other receivership pro-
ceedings.
On the whole, the act is a distinct improvement in law and will bring
our law more in line with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
LEsLiE J. A-Zs.
CRIMINAL LAW
Fraud in Sporting Contests. A new act, probably the outgrowth of
the Times Fish Derby scandal, makes it a gross misdemeanor to offer
or to receive a reward, or fraudulently to commit any act, with intent
to influence or change the outcome of any athletic or sporting con-
test.'
Railroad Rolling Stock. Another statute aims to prevent sabotage
in the railroads of the state, and was probably prompted by the pres-
ent emergency. The act makes it a felony to interfere with the mechan-
ism of any train or motor car capable of being used by "any railroad
or railway company in this state."2 Highway carriers if operated by a
191 Wash. 577, 71 P. (2d) 659 (1937).
§ 4 substantially re-enacts § 2(c) of L. '31, ch. 47; § 5 substantially re-enacts
§ 2(d). § 6(a) substantially re-enacts § 3(a), except for proviso, which proviso
seems erroneously to refer to § 4 rather than to § 5 in the foregoing provisions of
the act. § 6 (b) substantially re-enacts § 3 (b).
Federal Bankruptcy Act, § 70(c).
-.. '41, ch. 181, § 1.
2 L. '41, ch. 212, § 1.
19411
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railroad or railway would seem to be included. Any person buying or
receiving any of the property described in section 1, knowing the same
to have been stolen, is also guilty of a felonyY
Poisoning Animals. The legislature has made it a gross misdemeanor
to poison any domestic animal or bird.' Humane killings by owners or
agents are exempted.5 The sale or furnishing of strychnine by others
than registered pharmacists is prohibited (exempting state and federal
agents), and records of sales required.' If the pharmacist "shall sus-
pect that any person . . . intends to use" strychnine "for poisoning
... he may refuse to sell . . . but whether or not he makes such sale,
he shall ... notify the nearest peace officer." The act is entirely de-
ficient in defining the grounds of suspicion. The pharmacist has no
guide in the statute in deciding whether to chance a violation of the
statute by not reporting a doubtful case or subject himself to the possi-
bility of a civil action by one wrongfully accused.
Purchasing Liquor for Minors. The new act provides: "Any person
who invites a minor into a public place where liquor is sold and treats,
gives or purchases liquor for such minor or permits a minor to treat,
give or purchase for him; or holds out such minor to be over the age
of 21 years to the owner of the liquor establishment, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor."' The act limits the penalty to a person who in-
vites a minor into a public place, where liquor is sold. It does not ap-
ply to a minor who comes into such place voluntarily and is found
therein. The statute does not mention any kind of liquor. What is
meant by a "liquor establishment" as used in the statute? It might




Constables. Recent prosecutions of constables and justices of the
peace have pointed to an abuse of power by these officers, with at-
tendant inconvenience and expense to motorists. It is the evil so re-
vealed that the statute seeks to remedy. The law prohibiting constables
from serving criminal process or search warrants outside his own pre-
cinct is amended by adding "nor shall . . . [a constable] as such make
any arrests or detain any person ... for violation of ... laws concern-
ing motor vehicles and the operation thereof, except when serving a
warrant duly issued by the justice of the peace upon a complaint
3 Id., § 2.
'L. '41, ch. 105, § 1.
5 Ibid.
BId., § 2.
"L. '41, ch. 70, § 1.
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regularly filed . .'"-
Court Fund. The archaic county "court fund" of territorial days,
into which an 1863 statute provided that costs collected and sums re-
ceived on recognizances of defendants and witnesses in criminal cases
should be paid, has been abolished.
2
Attorneys' Fees. Counsel appointed by the court to defend one
charged with crime are each now permitted to receive not more than
$25 per day in court plus $25 for time spent in preparation. The
amended law allowed not more than $10 per day with no provision for
time spent in preparation for trial.2 This act was passed upon com-
plaint of attorneys that one appointed against his wishes to defend an
indigent criminal often suffered serious financial loss.
Jury Trials. An old statute providing that a defendant and the
prosecuting attorney can agree to trial by the court rather than by
jury is repealed." The Supreme Court had abrogated the statute, find-
ing a conflict with a later statute which requires conviction only on a
,plea of guilty, confession in open court, or by a jury verdict.,
Grand Jury. Two acts deal with the subject of attorneys to advise
the grand jury.8 Chapter 158 substitutes for the provision that, "the
prosecuting attorney shall attend upon the grand jury to examine wit-
nesses and give advice," a provision that the superior court shall ap-
point an attorney who shall perform these functions and who is not
subject in any way to the authority of the prosecuting attorney. Pro-
vision is made for payment of such special attorney. It further pro-
vides that when a special attorney is appointed the prosecutor has no
power to act or intervene. Chapter 191 amends the law defining the
duties of prosecuting attorneys, by striking out the clause requiring
their attendance upon grand juries, to examine witnesses and give ad-
vice, but retains the provision that indictments shall be drawn upon
request of the jury. This amendment provides that the prosecutor
hall not attend, appear before or give advice to the grand jury except
when "the calling of the grand jury has been initiated" by him. This
exception appears to be inconsistent with the provision in chapter 158
that the prosecutor has "no power to act or intervene" when a special
attorney is appointed-and the language of chapter 158 is that the
2L. '41, ch. 64, § 1, amending L. '35, ch. 138, § 1; Ras. R-v. STAT. (Supp.)
§ 7560-1.
2 L. '41, ch. 30, § 1.
3 L. '41, ch. 151, § 1, amending R!x. RFy. STAT. § 2305.
L. '41, ch. 24, § 1, repealing Rar. Rlv. STAT. § 2144.
5 REi. Rnv. STAT. § 2309. The cases are State v. McCow, 198 Wash. 349, 88
P. (2d),444 (1939); State v. Karsunky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P. (2d) 290 (1938).
iL. '41, ch. 158, § 1 (approved by the Governor on March 21), amending
'x. RE.v.'STAT. § 2032; L. '41, ch. 191, § 1 (approved by the Governor on March
24), amending REm. REv. STAT. § 4136. Both acts passed the House and the Senate
on the same days.
1941]
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court "shall appoint" a special attorney, without exception made for
cases in which the prosecutor initiates the call.7 Neither act having an
emergency clause both will take effect at the same time even though
approved on different days by the governor," so there can be no ref-
ence to the rule of statutory construction that a later act prevails.
Moreover, the rule that statutes dealing with the same subject matter
shall be construed together'0 to harmonize them has particular applica-
tion to enactments passed at the same session and, especially, on the
same day." Standing alone chapter 158 means that an attorney ap-
pointed by the court shall entirely supplant the prosecuting attorney
before the grand jury. All of the changes effected by chapter 191 point
the same way until the exception clause is reached. The condition
upon which the exception clause is operative presents the anomaly. If
the exception clause is, when considered in connection with the old
and other portions of the two new statutes, construed to mean that the
prosecuting attorney may appear and present facts and state his rec-
ommendations only when he has initiated the calling of the jury with-
out, however, being required to so appear and without the right to
examine witnesses and without the right or duty to further advise the
grand jury upon the action to be taken by it, the two statutes may be
reconciled. If the words of condition in the exception clause are lit-
erally construed the two statutes will give rise to inevitable conflicts
between the two attorneys who are authorized to attend upon, appear
before and advise the grand jury when the prosecuting attorney has
initiated the call. The two statutes illustrate not only inept draftsman-
ship but slipshod handling by the committees in both houses.
J. GRATTAN O'BRYAN.
EVIDENCE
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.' With some variations
presently to be noticed, this Act follows the Uniform Act approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1936.2 Adoption of the Uniform Act was recommended in 1938 by the
Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the Section of
'The attempt to distinguish between cases in which the call is initiated by the
prosecutor and when not so initiated is puzzling because the constitution provides
that "no grand jury shall be drawn or summoned in any county, except the superior
judge thereof shall so order." WASH. CONST., Art. I, § 26. In any event all that the
prosecuting attorney can do is to request that a grand jury be impanelled.
' WASH. CONST., Art. II, § 1(c), first sentence (7th amend.).
Whitfield v. Davies, 78 Wash. 256, 138 Pac. 883 (1914).
"o State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Clausen, 63 Wash. 535, 116 Pac. 7 (1911);
Kruesel v. Collin, 171 Wash. 200, 203, 17 P. (2d) 854 (1933).
" State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Clausen, supra note 10.
'L. '41, ch. 82.
29 Un=oRm LAWS ANN. (1940 Supp.) 106.
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Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association,3 in 1939 by
the Evidence Section of the Committee on Judicial Administration of
the Washington State Bar Association,4 and in 1941 by the Washington
Judicial Council.5 The enactment is in the form recommended by the
Judicial Council.'
Without statutory intervention, the rule has been practically uni-
versal that the law of another state will not be judicially noticed, being
"in theory that of an independent sovereign."17  And except in one
situation,8 such has been the local doctrine: "Foreign laws must be
pleaded and proved as any other fact, and in this regard the law of
another state is as the law of a foreign country." 9 In the absence of
such pleading and proof, the court has presumed the foreign law to be
the same as the law of this state, statutory as well as common. 10
Even prior to the drafting of the Uniform Act, a substantial number
of states" had enacted statutes permitting the court to notice the law
of another state. The purpose of the present act, according to the
Commissioners' explanatory statement, 2 "is to provide in Section 1 a
uniform phrasing for this legislative movement." Up until January 1,
1941, the Uniform Act had been adopted in twelve states.13
Section 1 of the Act requires "every court of this state" to take
judicial notice of the "Constitution, common law, civil law and statutes
of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States."
Section 1 of the Uniform Act extends only to the "common law and
statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United
States." This amplification of the Uniform Act follows a similar varia-
63 A. B. A. Rep. 593.
'(1939) 14 WAsH. L. Rzv. 338, 342.
Seventh Report, Judicial Council, January, 1941, p. 9.
'Id. at 21.
79 WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2573. 3 BEA., Coz _mcT oF LAWS(1935) §§ 621.2, 621.3.
' In an action upon a foreign judgment, judicial notice has been taken of the
foreign law upon which jurisdiction to render the judgment depends. Trowbridge
v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125 (1900); Miller v. Miller, 90 Wash. 333, 156
Pac. 8 (1916); Rubin v. Dale, 156 Wash. 676, 288 Pac. 223 (1930). See Comment,
(1939) 14 WAs. L. Ray. 222, and Note (1936) 11 WAsr. L. REv. 267.
'In re Stewart's Estate, 26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148 (1901).
" Even to the point of presuming the existence of the community property
system in Oregon (Gunderson v. Gunderson, 25 Wash. 459, 65 Pac. 791 (1901)),
in Montana (Clark v. Eltinge, 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736 (1902)) and in Alaska
(Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916)). The Washington cases are
collected in REsTATEmENT, Coqre. or LAws; WAsH. ANNoT. (1940) § 623. For
instructive discussions of the presumption, see Kales, Presumption of the Foreign
Law, (1906) 19 HARv. L. REv. 501, and 3 BEeAIE, CoN=cr OF LAws (1935) §§
622A.1, 622A.2, 623.1.
"Thirteen: Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
22 9 UN0IRM LAWS ANN., 1940 Supp., p. 106.
" Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota.
1941]
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tion in the Oregon Act of 1937.14 While the language of the Uniform
Act perhaps would be construed to include the constitutional, as well
as the statutory law of a sister state, and possibly also the civil law of
Louisiana and of such of the insular possessions of the United States
as are "jurisdictions of the United States," the Washington act desir-
ably makes the matter clear.
Section 2 provides that the court may inform itself of the law of a
sister state in such manner as it may deem proper, and may call upon
counsel to aid it in obtaining this information. 15
Section 3 provides that "the determination of such laws shall be
made by the court and not by the jury and shall be reviewable." Be-
cause the common law rule treated foreign law as a matter of fact, it
was generally held that the tenor of the foreign law was to be deter-
mined by the jury." From the provisions of Section 1, requiring the
law of a sister state to be judicially noticed, it would seem to follow
that the determination of the tenor of the foreign law is a matter ex-
clusively for the judge. However, Section 3 makes this conclusion
express and certain. The section, say the Commissioners, has been
included "to avoid any doubt that the old rule remains of treating it
as a question of fact and therefore not reviewable."' 7
Section 4 of the Uniform Act provides: "Any party may also present
to the trial court any admissible evidence of such laws, but, to enable
a party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask
that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given
to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise." For this
section there has been substituted in the Washington Act the follow-
ing: "This act shall not be construed to relieve any party of the duty
of hereafter pleading such laws where required under the law and
practice of this state immediately prior to the enactment hereof."
By this substitution there is thus eliminated the provision of the
Uniform Act according to a party the right to present any admissible
evidence of foreign law. It is difficult to perceive why this provision
was eliminated unless it was thought unnecessary, as perhaps it is.18
"' ORE. LAWS 1937, c. 106. The Oregon statute is discussed in Comment, (1938)
17 ORE. L. REv. 259. The writer of this comment reads the expression "civil law"
in the statute as "civil laws," meaning "written" or statutory law. This appears
to be a complete misconception.
15 That this is an appropriate method of assisting the court in taking judicial
notice, see Moore v. Dresden Investment Co., 162 Wash. 289, 307, 298 Pac. 465,
472 (1931); 9 WIGo0RE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2568(a); 23 C. J. 169, § 2001.
9 WIGMORE, EVIENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2558.
"9 UNUORm LAWS AmN., 1940 Supp., p. 106.
'8 "That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true with-
out the offering of evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so. This
is because the Court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed. But the opponent is not prevented from disputing the matter by evidence,
if he believes it disputable." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDFNCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2567.
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More important, the substitution expressly preserves that part of the
existing doctrine requiring the existence and tenor of a foreign law to
be pleaded, the general effect of the act merely being to dispense with
the necessity of proof. This express saving provision is a desirable in-
clusion because outside authority is in conflict on the question whether
provisions like those in Section 1 operate to dispense with the neces-
sity of pleading as well as proving the foreign law.19 It is clear, then,
that so far as this enactment is concerned the existence and tenor of
foreign law, statutory or unwritten, must continue to be pleaded in ac-
cordance with the existing rule.20
It will be noted that under the provisions of Section 1, judicial no-
tice is taken only of the law of the states, territories and other juris-
dictions of the United States. The law of foreign nations is not included.
But the latter, according to the provisions of Section 5, "shall be an
issue for the court." As has been said, it was generally held at common
law that the existence or tenor of foreign law was a matter of fact, to
be determined by the jury,2' though the rule has been subject to
much criticism, 22 and has not been universally followed. Nor is it the
law in Washington. "In our opinion," says the Washington court,
"where proof of foreign laws is necessary to be introduced, such proof
should be addressed to the court and not to the jury, and the court
should interpret the foreign laws for the jury, and instruct the jury
thereon." 23 Consequently, whatever may be the case in.other enacting
jurisdictions, Section 5 of the Uniform Act does not appear to work any
change in the local law.
JuDsoN F. FALxNOR.
NATIONAL DEFENSE
The 1941 Washington Legislature enacted several statutes supple-
menting federal defense legislation and furthering local participation
in national defense efforts.
Litigation and Debts. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940 is substantially a re-enactment by Congress of similar legislation
passed in 1918 and affords protection against the embarrassment which
men in military service may encounter in defending litigation and in
"' The California court has held that a statute similar to Section 1 of the Uniform
Act operates to dispense with the pleading as well as the proof of the foreign law:
Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P. (2d) 63 (1932). Contra: Savannah Ry.
v. Evans, 121 Ga. 391, 49 S. E. 308 (1904); Richards v. Richards, 270 Mass. 113,
169 N. E. 891 (1930).
'
0 As to the proper method of pleading the foreign law, see 3 B.ALE, CoNuLicT
op LAWS § 621.4; RESTATEmENT, CoNr. OF LAWS; WASH. ANNOr. (1940) § 621.
2 9 Wxmoa, EvmiENcE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2558.
"' "The only sound view, either on principle or on policy, is that it should be
proved to the judge, who is decidedly the more appropriate person to determine
it." Id. See also 3 BEALE, CoNycT OF LAWS (1935) § 621.5.
" Rood v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 232 Pac. 450 (1924).
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meeting their financial obligations.1 Although local enabling statutes
are not necessary in order to make this Act obligatory on state courts,2
our act directs that it be applied in our courts. 3
Statute of Limitations. Among the provisions of the federal Civil
Relief Act is one suspending statutes of limitations as to actions both
by and against persons in military service.4 Since its provisions bind
state courts,5 local legislation is unnecessary, and if enacted should cer-
tainly not diverge from the federal act. Our statute suspends the lim-
itations statute as to actions against but not as to actions by, soldiers
and sailors.6
Re-employment. The Selective Service Act of 1940 undertook among
other things to ease some of the economic hardships of military service
by aiding the ex-service man in securing employment. The method
used is that of requiring re-hiring by the employer from whose employ
the man was taken.7 The Washington law covers substantially the
same ground, with modifications appropriate for a state enactment. 8
It enjoins of the employer under heavy penalty9 the re-hiring upon
discharge from such service, in the same or a like capacity, of any
resident of Washington called to duty under the Selective Service Act
or the National Guard and Reserve Officers Mobilization Act. The
chapter applies to both private and public employers, with special pro-
visions for elective or appointive public officials. The terms of these
are not to be extended by military service.10 To be entitled to re-
employment the employee must apply to his former employer within
40 days of leaving the federal service and show that he is still qualified
to handle his job. 1 Refusal to re-hire can be excused, by a private em-
ployer upon proof that his circumstances "have so changed as to make
'Pub. Act 861, 76th Cong., Oct. 17, 1940. It will probably go into the U. S.
C. A. under Title 50, § 100, etc. The statute is discussed briefly in a symposium,
Mobilization for Defense, (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 1374, 1383; 54 HARv. L. REv.
278; 50 YALE L. J. 250, 259.
2 See note 5, infra.
3 L. '41, ch. 201, § 5.
'Pub. Act 861, 76th Cong., Oct. 17, 1940, Art. II, § 205.
' See annotations 9 A. L. R. 81; 16 A. L. R. 1327; 6 WIaTasToN AND TnOmpsoN,
CONTRACTS, § 2013.6L. '41, ch. 174, § 1(b), amending REM. REv. STAT. § 171. § 1(a) of ch. 174
merely re-enacts REM. REV. STAT. § 171, suspending the limitations statute as to
alien subjects or citizens of countries at war with the United States.
'Pub. Act 783, 76th Cong., Sept. 16, 1940, § 8; Title 50 U. S. C. A. § 308(e).
The statute is discussed in the symposium in note 1, (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1374,
1384; 54 HARv. L. REv. 278, 288; 50 YALE L. J. 250, 261.
'L. '41, ch. 201, § 1.
'The employee may have specific enforcement of the duty to re-hire and may
recover wages lost by reason of a wrongful refusal to re-hire. "Wilful failure or
refusal" to re-hire is made a gross misdemeanor, ch. 201, § 4. The federal act pro-
vides the same civil remedies, Title 50 U. S. C. A. § 308(e), and punishes "know-
ing" violations by imprisonment up to 5 years and fine up to $10,000. Title 50
U. S. C. A. § 311.
10 L. '41, ch. 201, §§ 1, 2.
1 "Id., § 1.
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it impossible or unreasonable to do so"; by a public employer upon
proof that the circumstances surrounding the governmental office in
question have so changed "as to make restoration impossible, unrea-
sonable or against the public interest."'" Further, after re-employment,
the employee "shall not be discharged from such position without cause
within one year after such restoration."'8 These latter provisions con-
tain the seeds of much controversy and litigation. It has been sug-
gested that decisions under the National Labor Relations Act will be
helpful in resolving many of the difficult problems involved in apply-
ing this statute.'4 Chapter 201 also preserved the interest of employees
in seniority rights, retirement and unemployment compensation funds.' 5
Enforcement of the chapter is enjoined of the attorney general, or,
at his direction, of prosecuting attorneys, saving however the right of
the employee to retain privatp counsel should he prefer.'6
This legislation is a laudable attempt to meet a very real problem,
the ramifications of which will be realized upon considering the diffi-
culties faced by ex-service men in 1919. Whether it is really a solution
is not so clear. Unless the courts are willing to give the statute a con-
struction which will require employers to fire their then workmen to
make places for discharged service men it is only a gesture. If such
construction is given, what of the people thrown out of work to make
way for the soldier and sailor? The statute cannot be construed to
force re-employment if the employer does not have work to be done.
Dislocation and placement problems may not be great in a rising labor
market, provided large numbers are not involved. But how will this
type of law operate should we have a general mobilization, and later
demobilization of several million men within a short period of time?
How will it work if a sharp curtailment of productive activity and a
falling labor market accompany the return of ex-service men to peace-
time occupations? Perhaps there is a basic requirement, stabilization
of labor demand, which must be met before these enactments can
achieve their purpose or achieve it without creating as many economic
ailments as they remedy.
Criminal Anarcky. The code sections defining and punishing crim-
inal anarchy were amended and strengthened by adding the radio and
printing to the prohibited methods of advocating anarchistic doc-
trines." The amendment also provided that no person convicted of
criminal anarchy "shall be an employee of the state, or any depart-
ment, agency, or subdivision thereof during the five (5) years next
22Id., § 1. 131d., § 3.
" Mobilization for Defense, supra, note 7.
15 L. '41, ch. 201, §§ 3, 6.
"Id. § 4. Similar duties are placed on United States district attorneys by the
federal statute. Title 50 U. S. C. A. § 308(e).
7 L. '41, ch. 215, amending RPm. REv. STAT. §§ 2562, 2563.
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following his conviction." "'
Protective Defense Areas. The Governor is authorized to designate
"protective defense areas"' 9 within which it shall be unlawful to pos-
sess "firearms, explosives, ammunition, or component parts of firearms
or anything which is made or constructed for the purpose of destroy-
ing or injuring property or human life," or "telescopes, binoculars,
cameras, or photographic equipment." Of such areas it shall be un-
lawful to make a "photograph, sketch, map." It is also made unlaw-
ful to "reproduce or make notes or memoranda pertaining to national
defense works or articles, materials, personnel, or activities pertaining
to national defense" or to "possess, use, or control any photograph,
negative, film, plate, sketch, map, plan, or other representation, made or
taken in violation of this act." 20  The possession of firearms, and the
other articles mentioned above, in "air space reservations" as prescribed
by the President are also prohibited.21 Exceptions are made for per-
sons duly authorized by indicated public officials to do the prohibited
acts. Violation of the statute was made a gross misdemeanor.
2 2
The avowed purpose of this act is cooperation with the Federal
Government in preventing conduct detrimental to defense activity. It
is part of a nationwide movement toward state legislation protecting
and fostering various phases of national defense.2
Defense Councils. A body has been created to be known as the "State
Defense Council," the personnel of which is to be appointed by and
hold office at the pleasure of the Governor. 4 The functions of this group
are specified 29 and seem to be to cooperate with similar groups in other
states and with the Advisory Commission of the Council of National
Defense, and fact finding in defense matters. The Governor is also em-
powered to establish and disestablish Local Defense Councils, within
what geographical areas the act does not specify, the duties of which
are cooperation with the state body and "such services as may be
requested by the Governor or State Council.
2 6
'
8 L. '41, ch. 215, § 2(4).19 L. '41, ch. 200, § 2 defines protective defense area very broadly to include both
public and private property of every type upon which defense activity is carried
on or defense materials located.
-old., § 4, 5, 6.
2 1 d., 99 5, 6.
22 Id., § 7.
2" See Warner, The Model Sabotage Prevention Act, (1941) 54 HARV. L. REv.
602; cf. Pressman, Leider, Cammer, Sabotage and National Defense (1941) 54
HARv. L. REv. 632.
2' L. '41, ch. 177, § 2. The membership of the State Council is limited to 18.
§ 3 (a).
25 Id., § 4.
26Members of the State Council are to serve without pay, § 3(c), but are to
be provided with office and clerical help and be reimbursed for travel expenses,
§ 3(b), (c) and (d). The statute carries an appropriation to cover these items.
With regard to pay, office, clerical assistance and travel expenses for local councils
the statute is silent.
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Explosives. The law now on the books 2r regulating the manufacture
and use of explosives is definitely tightened by chapter 101. The-changes
have to do with national defense. This is shown in the strict require-
ment as to citizenship and the grant of authority to deny or cancel a





Notice of Proceedings. Interested persons are permitted under our
statutes to require an administrator or executor after the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration to give special notice of certain
matters in the probate proceedings. The amendment adds to the matters
in which notice must be given, a "petition for any order of solvency".1
Since an order of solvency is required only in cases of non-intervention
wills, and since letters testamentary are not issued to an executor of a
non-intervention will,2 it would seem that the statute as amended can
have no application.
Guardians. The legislature has now avoided the expense and incon-
venience of appointing a guardian for a minor where the sum to be
distributed to him is less than $100.3
A guardian may now invest any moneys properly available in any
investment which is legal for trust companies or mutual savings banks
under the laws of Washington without court permission. 4 He may also
deposit funds in any insured bank. A court cannot permit other invest-
ments unless the guardian shows substantial detriment to his ward from
a refusal.
Our old statutes provided that a guardian had a duty to render an
accounting to the court every two yeArs, and failing to do so, he would
be allowed no compensation, and also he would be liable to the ward
in an amount equal to 10% of the estate." The amendment now pro-
vides: on failure to report the guardian shall receive no compensation,
and he shall be liable in damages for costs, disbursements, and reason-
able attorney's fees incurred in any proceeding by the ward against the
guardian to establish the former's rights.' The court had previously held
21 REM. REV. STAT. § 5440-1-22.
28 L. '41, ch. 101, §§ 1, 2,3.
L. '41, ch. 206, § 1, amending REm. REv. STAT. § 1434.
REM. REV. STAT. § 1462.3 L. '41, ch. 206, § 2, amending REM. RIEv. STAT. § 1434.
4 L. '41, ch. 206, § 3, amending REm. REv. STAT. § 1434. The trust investment
statutes are REm. REv. STAT. § 3255-a-t. Mutual Savings Banks, R-m. REv. STAT.
33 3323, 3381-2, 3324-3341. Note amendments by this session, L. '41, ch. 41.
REM. REv. STAT. § 1575.
8 L. 41, ch. 83, § 1.
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the penalty arbitrary, and the section unconstitutional.7
J. GnATTAN O'BRYAN.
REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS
Chiropody. The definition of the "practice of chiropody" has been
changed somewhat.' It is now specifically limited to treatment of the
human foot, a point on which the former statute was ambiguous. On
the other hand, it now includes "manipulative and electrical" treat-
ments, kinds not previously specified.
Dentistry. Two changes have been made in the provisions in respect
to examinations for admission to practice. The members of the Board
of Dental Examiners are, in the future, to be appointed by the Gov-
ernor from lists submitted by the Washington component of the Ameri-
can Dental Association, five or more names for each vacancy, and each
appointee must be a citizen of the United States.2 This, of course, is a
step in the direction of self-government by the dental profession, or
rather, that part of it affiliated with the National Association. It is an
important step, since for all practical purposes the examining board has
control of admissions to practice. It is interesting to note that whereas
attorneys on the one side have achieved almost complete autonomy in
the selection of the examining board,3 physicians and other practitioners
of the healing sciences have no direct voice in the selection of their
examining boards, that power being vested in the Governor.4
The other change is the imposition of a fee of $15 upon the taking
of a second examination by an unsuccessful applicant, which was for-
merly given without charge, and the requirement that an applicant
failing his second examination must successfully pass the senior exami-
nations of an approved dental college before he can take a third exami-
nation."
Medicine and Surgery. An annual "renewal registration fee" of $5
has been imposed upon licensed practitioners. 6 This removes a long-
standing discrimination in favor of physicians and surgeons, since prac-
In re Deming, 192 Wash. 190, 73 P. (2d) 764 (1937).
'L. '41, ch. 31, § 1, amending L. '21, ch. 120, § 1; Ras. Rw. STAT. § 10074.
2 L. '41, ch. 92, § 1, amending L. '35, ch. 112, § 2; Rs2m. REv. STAT. (Supp.)
§ 10031-2. In other respects the qualifications of members of the Board are un-
changed.
3 REm. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 138-8 (Supreme Court has veto power).
'REM. REV. STAT. § 10854, 10857, 10185-1 to 10185-6. Under these statutes
the Director of Licenses has a general supervision over examinations and some
control of the results.
5L. '41, ch. 92, § 2, amending L. '35, ch. 112, § 4; Rar. Rev. STAT. (Supp.)
§ 10031-4. The former act said nothing as to examinations after a second failure.
OL. '41, ch. 166, § 1, 2, superseding and repealing REM. Rxv. STAT. § 10010.
The former requirement that a physician's license be recorded with the city clerk
in the city in which he practices has been repealed. L. '41, ch. 166, § 2, repealing
RE. REv. STAT. §§ 10012, 10013.
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titioners of other healing arts have for many years paid such annual
fees.7
Veterinary Medicine, Surgery and Dentistry. A complete new statute
has passed regulating practice of this profession.8 The changes effected
in the law have not been great, however, and only a few will be dis-
cussed.
The qualifications for admission to practice have been raised in
several respects. Whereas formerly "any person" was entitled to take
the examination, and, if successful, to be licensed," no person now is
eligible to take the examination unless he is 21 years of age, of "good
moral character," a graduate of a college recognized by the American
Veterinary Medical Association, and has not been found guilty by the
Director of Licenses of "unprofessional conduct" within the two pre-
ceding years.'0 The form and scope of the examination is prescribed in
some detail," in contrast to the former law which apparently gave the
examining board a free hand.'
-
The new law provides for licensing without examination veterinarians
licensed in other states upon certification of good character and pro-
fessional standing and the payment of a fee of $50, provided that such
other state accords the same privilege to Washington licensees.' 8 This
brings the law into line with that governing other healing professions."4
Under the former law a veterinarian once licensed was free from
further administrative control; no provision was made for the revocation
of his license. The new act requires the payment of an annual "re-
newal" fee of $5 as a condition to continue in practice,' 5 and makes
detailed provisions for the revocation of licenses. The revoking body is
a "committee" of two veterinarians, appointed by the Governor, and
the Director of Licenses.16 Revocation or suspension is to follow a find-
ing after notice and hearing that the licensee has been guilty of. "un-
professional conduct," defined in some detail' An appeal will lie from
7 Chiropodists ($3), Px.=. REv. STAT. § 10082; chiropractors ($5), Rr.z. RFv.
STAT. § 10105; dentists ($2), RPx~. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10031-24; optometrists
($2), REm. REV. STAT. § 10158; osteopaths ($5), Rair. REv. STAT. § 10058; phar-
macists ($3), Rm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10136. An annual fee of $5 is now imposed
upon veterinarians for the first time. L. '41, ch. 71, § 19(c).
B L. '41, ch. 71, superseding and repealing L. '07, ch. 124, as amended by L. '13,
ch. 79; REir. REV. STAT. §§ 10040-10055.
0 REz. REv. STAT. § 10047.
10 L. '41, ch. 71, § 6.
"L. '41, ch. 71, §§ 7, 8.
RxE. REv. STAT. § 10047.
23 L. '41, ch. 71, §§ 12, 19(b). The former statute contained no similar provision
and presumably an examination was required in such cases.
"' See, e.g., physicians and surgeons, Rnrm.. REv. STAT. § 10023 ; dentists, R=.
REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10031-13.
'
5 L. '41, ch. 71, §§ 17, 19(c).
"Id., § 13, incorporating by reference REm. REv. STAT. § 10861.
'
7 L. '41, ch. 71, §§ 13, 14.
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an order of revocation to the superior court of any county18 where the
action will be tried de novo.19
JOHN B. SHOLLEY.
TORTS
Liability for Dog Bites. Chapter 77 is a new act which changes mate-
rially the owner's liability for personal injuries inflicted by his dog.
Identical in essentials with the New Jersey Statute,1 its enactment places
Washington in the comparatively small group of states2 which have
partially or completely substituted a statutory rule for the common law
tort basis of liability. Hitherto, liability was imposed only when scienter
of the dog's vicious tendencies on the part of the owner or harborer
was shown,3 though knowledge of a servant could be imputed to him'
and actual knowledge, in the sense that the dog must already have
attacked a person, was not required so long as its tendency to do so
was known.' The basis for liability was not negligence, 6 but a species
of absolute liability-the vicious dog was kept at the keeper's peril;
accordingly contributory negligence was no defense,' and the owner was
subject to liability even to trespassers on his premises,8 at least where
the trespass was merely technical.
"8 This is an unusual venue provision. The corresponding provision as to appeals
from revocation orders in the administrative code which applies to most professions,
fixes the venue in Thurston County (Rm. REv. STAT. § 10864), as does that in
respect to dentists (Raar. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10031-9).
Il L. '41, ch. 71, § 15. The scope of review is apparently the same as that pro-
vided by the general provisions of the administrative code. Ram. Rav. STAT. §
10864 (same as appeals from justice court to superior court).
1 N. J. REv. STATS. § 4:19-16: "The owner of any dog which shall bite a person
while such person is on or in a public place or lawfully on or in a private place,
including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages
as may be suffered, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's
knowledge of such viciousness. For the purposes of this section, a person is lawfully
on the property of the owner when he is on the land in the performance of a duty
imposed by the laws of the state or of the United States or the postal regulations,
or by invitation of the owner, express or implied."
2 CONN. GEN. STATS. § 3357; D. C. CODE § 919; FLA. GEN. LAWS § 7044; IOWA
CODE § 5450; ME. REv. STATS., ch. 5, § 165; Ky. STAT. § 68a-5; MASS. ANN. LAWS,
ch. 140, § 155; N. H. PUB. LAWS, ch. 150, § 23; N. C. CODE § 1680; OMO CODE §
5838; R. I. GEN. LAWS, ch. 639, § 3; UTAH REv. STATS. § 24-0-1; W. VA. CODE
§ 2145; Wis. STATS. § 174.02.
' Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171 Wash. 617, 18 P. (2d) 837 (1933); Shelby v.
Seung, 144 Wash. 317, 257 Pac. 838 (1927) ; Kayser v. Foster, 138 Wash. 484, 244
Pac. 708 (1926); Miller v. Reeves, 101 Wash. 642, 172 Pac. 815 (1918); Mailhot v.
Crowe, 99 Wash. 623, 170 Pac. 131 (1918); Halm v. Madison, 65 Wash. 588, 118
Pac. 755 (1911); Lynch v. Kineth, 36 Wash. 368, 78 Pac. 923 (1904); Robinson
v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434, 28 Pac. 752 (1892).
'Lynch v. Kineth, 36 Wash. 368, 78 Pac. 923 (1904) (vicious horse).
'Mailhot v. Crowe, 99 Wash. 623, 170 Pac. 131 (1918).
'Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171 Wash. 617, 18 P. (2d) 837 (1933); Gunderson v.
Vieren, 80 Wash. 459, 142 Pac. 685 (1914) (bull); Harris v. Carstens Packing Co.,
43 Wash. 647, 86 Pac. 1125 (1906) (steer); Lynch v. Knight, 36 Wash. 368, 78
Pac. 923 (1904) (horse).




Under the present act, scienter is removed as a prerequisite to liabil-
ity so long as the injured person is in a public, or lawfully in a private,
place, including the premises of the owner of the dog. Public servants,
on the premises of the owner in the performance of any duty imposed
by statute or ordinance, are said by section 2 to be lawfully thereon
within the meaning of the statute.9 Under section 3 proof of provocation
of the attack by the injured person is made a complete defense.10
It should be noted that the common law rule is unchanged in some
particulars. A harborer or keeper, as distinguished from the owner,'
is still not subject to liability without proof of scienter, nor is the owner'
if the injured person is unlawfully on his premises.
Regulating Blasting. Chapter 107 is a new act which makes it unlaw-
ful to blast between January 15 and June 15 within fifteen hundred
feet of any fur farm or commercial hatchery except in cases of emer-
gency without first giving twenty-four hours notice to the person in
charge thereof, a proviso for a blanket notice being inserted for the
benefit of quarry operators who blast continually. Within the dates
given fall the mating and whelping seasons of the commercial fur bear-
ing animals, and it is apparently for the protection of their owners that
the act was passed. It should not change liability; though blasting
without giving the required notice will be unlawful and hence subject
those setting off the blast to liability, blasting with notice will have
exactly the same effect,1 2 nor is it clear what a fur farmer can do to
protect himself if notice is given.' 8
JomH W. RicA1ws.
9 This section is probably unnecessary, since the same result is reached by the
common law rule when a person enters on the land of another pursuant to legislative
duty or authority. RESTATEwMNT, ToRTs (1934) § 211. As to the effect of unreason-
able conduct destroying the original privilege of entry under the doctrine of trespass
ab initio, see, REsTATEmENT, ToRTs (1934) § 214 (2). Presumably the same result
would be reached under this section of the act.
1 This section leaves untouched an additional defense, based upon a type of
negligence frequently described as voluntary assumption of risk; i. e., where plain-
tiff, knowing of the danger, intentionally and unreasonably puts himself within
reach of it. See RESTATEMaNT, TORTS (1934) § 484 (2), 466 (b).
" As to the distinction, important under this act, see Miller v. Reeves, 101
Wash. 642, 172 Pac. 815 (1918), and Markwood v. McBroom, 110 Wash. 208, 188
Pac. 521 (1920). It seems unlikely that the court, in view of the rule as to the
construction of statutes in derogation of the common law, will construe "owner"
to include a mere keeper or harborer.
" Tough there is a division of opinion as to the basis for liability for injuries
caused by the use of explosives, the more acceptable view imposes absolute liability
whenever there is any likelihood of harm regardless.of the negligence of or the care
used by the person responsible,-this on the theory that it is an ultrahazardous
activity which is -carried on at peril. Patrick v. Smith, 75 Wash. 407, 134 Pac.
1076 (1913) ; Schade Brewing Co. v. C. M. & P. S. Ry., 79 Wash. 651, 140 Pac.
897 (1914); Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931); Notes (1934) 92 A. L. R. 741; RESTATFMENT, ToRTS.(1938) §§ 519, 520.
"




The trend toward liberalization of the social security system which
was disclosed by the adoption of the Senior Citizens' Grant Act1 at the
polls last November was further evidenced during the session of the
legislature. Indeed, the legislature apparently concluded that the organi-
zations sponsoring such legislation were becoming so strong that their
own members might need some protection. At any rate, a statute2 was
passed requiring every organization engaged in political or other activ-
ities in behalf of persons receiving public assistance and which received
25 per cent or more of its income from contributions from such re-
cipients to file an annual statement with the Department of Social
Security disclosing its income and the larger contributors thereto, and
its disbursements and the recipients thereof. Such statements are made
public records.
On the other hand, while their political agents are thus to be sub-
jected to the light of publicity, the beneficiaries of public assistance are
to be shielded more than in the past. Another statute3 provides that all
records and files of the Department of Social Security and the county
welfare departments shall be kept confidential except for purposes
"directly connected with the administration" of public assistance.
The confusion which has prevailed in the statutory foundations of
the social security system of this state since 1937 still continues. Some
ambiguities and conflicts have been resolved, but others have been
created. These will be pointed out in the detailed discussion to follow.
The chief cause of the uncertainty and doubt has been the legislative
practice of passing both general statutes4 covering all phases of public
assistance and special statutes5 covering only one branch thereof, e.g.,
assistance to the needy blind. Unfortunately, these two types of statutes
have been uniformly inconsistent; there has apparently been little or no
attempt to correlate them. This legislative failing has reappeared in the
already whelped, to devour their young, but a similar result follows any alarming
interference with them by their keepers, which should foreclose the possibility of
removing them to a place of safety. It is, of course, possible that upon giving the
statutory warning the blaster will learn of the possible consequences and hence
give up or postpone his undertaking. As to the somewhat eccentric habits of female
mink, see Hamilton v. King County, 195 Wash. 84, 79 P. (2d) 697 (1938).1 L. '41, ch. 1. This initiative measure is discussed in a Comment in this issue.
See p. 95, et seq.2 L. '41, ch. 170, § 7.
3 L. '41, ch. 128, § 5. A similar provision in the act of 1939 was vetoed. L. '39,
ch. 216, § 23. See also L. '41, ch. 1, § 20, for a similar provision in the
Senior Citizens' Grants Act. These provisions were enacted to comply with
the Federal Social Security Act as amended in 1939. 53 Stat. 1360, 1380, 1397;
42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1940), §§ 302(a) (8), 602(a) (8), 1202(a) (9).
'E.g., L. '37, chs. 111, 180; L. '39, cbs. 205, 216.
5 E.g., L. '37, chs. 114 (dependent children), 132 (needy blind), 156 (needy
aged); L. '39, ch. 25 (needy aged).
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work of the session just ended.6 The results are difficult problems of
statutory interpretation and reconciliation which may be finally solved
only in the courts.
The changes in the general statutes will be first considered.
General Administrative Organization. In addition to two minor
changes7 the 1941 legislature, for the second time since the social se-
curity system was established in 1937, changed the local administrative
agency of the system. In 1937 the county commissioners, under the
style of "local administrative boards," administered the various forms
of public assistance. 8 In 1939 the task of local administration was vested
in a "county administrator."9 The new statute vests this function in a
"county welfare department."' 0 The change is largely in nomenclature,
since the "department" is "in charge" of the "county administrator,"
and presumably will be composed of his appointees, just as his staff of
assistants formerly was. The county administrator, as before, is ap-
pointed by the county commissioners, although there is a change in the
composition of the list from which he may be chosen.'1
This change in agencies will no doubt be read into most existing
statutes.' 2 But two special acts raise some question. The first, the Senior
Citizens' Grants Act, being an initiative measure, cannot be superseded
or amended by any statute of the 1941 session.' 3 Its provisions, how-
ever, ate sufficiently flexible to permit the change in local administra-
tive agency.' 4 The second special statute is more troublesome. The
special statute relating to assistance to the blind purports to amend
the special act of 1937 on the same subject, which as has been noted
' General statute: L. '41, ch. 128. Special statutes: L. '41, chs. 129 (crippled
children), 170 (needy blind), 242 (dependent children). Moreover, the program
of assistance to needy aged is partially governed by the special initiative measure
adopted last November (L. '41, ch. 1), and partially by the general statute.7 L. '41, ch. 128, § 1, amending L. '39, ch. 216, § 3; REX . REv. STAT. (Supp.)§ 10007-103a, dealing with a merit system of personnel administration. L. '41, ch.
128, § 3, amending L. '39, ch. 216, § 10; REa. R v. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-110a,
dealing with county financing of public assistance.8 L. '37, ch. 114, § 9; REm. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 9992-109; L. '37, ch. 132,§ 7; REar. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-5; L. '37, ch. 180, §§ 2, 7.
9L. '39, ch. 216, § 4; REm. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-104a.
10 L. 41, ch. 128, § 2, amending L. '39, ch. 216, § 4; REar. REV. STAT. (Supp.)§ 10007-104a.
"Under the former act he was appointed from a list submitted by the Social
Security Committee. L. '39, ch. 216, § 4; REa. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-104a.
(As to the Committee, see L. '39, ch. 216, § 2, REr. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-
102a). Under the new act the county administrator is appointed "in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the merit system." L. '41, ch. 128, § 2. (As to
the "merit system," see L. '41, ch. 253, § 8, p. 896).1 2 L. '39, ch. 216. By § 35 (REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-135a) of this
act, the general act of 1937 (L. '37, ch. 180) was specifically repealed, as were
all other acts and parts thereof in conflict with the 1939 act.
23 WASH. CoNsT. A.rEmm. VII.
1" The pertinent sections refer to the "department or an authorized agency of
the department." L. '41, ch. 1, §§3(e), 6, 7, 8.15 L. '41, ch. 170.
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was probably partially repealed in 1939.16 By some blunder, this 1941
act in amending, and re-enacting certain sections of the 1937 act, re-
enacted the old provisions which referred to "local administrative
boards,"17 although such boards ceased to exist in 1939.
To whom then shall a blind applicant for public assistance make his
application, to the county commissioners or to the new county welfare
board? The real difficulty in answering this question arises from the
fact that the two inconsistent statutes were approved by the governor
on the same day. The special statute might be held to prevail because
it is special, but on the other hand, the general statute is an "emer-
gency" statute which went into effect on April first."8 All in all, the
legislature has posed a nice problem in statutory reconciliation, which,
fortunately, the writer need not solve.
General Provisions for Appeals. The legislature filled the gap in the
procedural structure caused by the veto of the appeal provisions of the
1939 act, 9 which act, as we have seen, itself repealed the provisions of
the 1937 act.20 The new statute 21 provides that any applicant for fed-
eral aid assistance 2 who is aggrieved by the county department's action
thereon is entitled to appeal to the Department of Social Security which
shall afford him an opportunity for a "fair hearing." The Department
may also review individual cases upon its own motion. The details of
the procedure are left to be filled in by departmental regulations.
The provision for judicial review is as follows: "Any person aggrieved
by the decision of the department may appeal to the Superior Courts
by proceedings in certiorari." 23 This formula is a novel one for this
state so far as the writer is aware, and it raises questions as to the
6 See note 12, supra.
" L. '41, ch. 170, § 2 (providing for filing of applications with "the local ad-
ministrative board"), § 3 (issuance of orders for assistance by such board), § 4
(judicial appeal from action of such board).
"SA statute with an emergency clause has been held to prevail over a con-
flicting one without such a clause when both were approved by the governor on
the same day: Heilig v. Puyallup City Council, 7 Wash. 29, 34 Pac. 164 (1893);
Spokane County v. Certain Lots, 153 Wash. 462, 279 Pac. 724 (1929). In neither
of these cases, however, did the emergency act pass the legislature before the one
without emergency clause, as is true here. That the time of passage and emer-
gency clause in one act are but supplemental guides to resolve a conflict is indi-
cated in State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Clausen, 63 Wash. 535, 116 Pac. 7
(1911).
" L. '39, ch. 216, § 22.
20 L. '37, ch. 180, § 12. These provisions were the only ones in effect from
1937 until 1939. State ex rel. Shomaker v. Superior Court, 193 Wash. 465, 76 P.
(2d) 306 (1938); McAvoy v. Ernst, 196 Wash. 416, 83 P. (2d) 245 (1938). Upon
their repeal, however, the provisions of the special acts, which had been super-
seded by the inconsistent terms of the general 1937 statute, were probably revived.
21 L. '41, ch. 128, § 4.
2
"This includes old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, services to
crippled children, child welfare services, and aid to the needy blind. L. '39, ch.
216, § 1; Raa. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-101a.
23 L. '41, ch. 128, § 4.
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character and scope of the review provided. The most likely interpreta-
tion is that the legislature intended a proceeding under the general
"writ of review" statute.24 The scope of the review under this statute
is rather broad: it covers the jurisdiction of the tribunal below, the
legality of the mode of procedure below, the presence of competent
proof, and the existence of sufficient proof to support the decision
below. 25 These provisions seem consistent with the further provisions
in the new statute that the decision of the state department shall be
final as to all questions of fact 25
If this interpretation is sound, the appellate procedure so provided
is somewhat less favorable to an aggrieved applicant than that under the
Senior Citizens' Grants Act, and more favorable than that under the
new assistance for the blind statute. The former permits the introduc-
tion of additional evidence upon appeal and apparently authorizes the
court to make independent findings of fact upon the record and the new
evidence.27 The latter limits the review to the record and permits a
reversal only upon a finding that the administrative tribunal acted
capriciously or arbitrarily.28
Another difference lies in the fact that both of the new special
statutes mentioned expressly provide that where an applicant succeeds
in establishing his claim upon appeal, assistance shall be paid from the
time of application,25 whereas the general statute is silent on this point.
However, a previous decision of the supreme court would indicate that
the same result should be reached despite this legislative silence. 80
Again the question of inconsistent special statutes arises. The Senior
Citizens' Grants Act has its own detailed provisions for administrative
and judicial review of initial decisions on applications. 8' These provi-
sions are not superseded by the later general statute.32 The latter, then,
has no application to old age assistance claims, unless it could be said
that the aggrieved applicant has an election and can follow either
statutory path in search of relief.
The 1941 statute relating to assistance to the needy blind also con-
tains inconsistent appeal provisions, which are outlined below. 3 This
24
Rmm . REV. STAT. §§ 1001-1012.
2 5 RE. RIxv. STAT. § 1010. For a recent ca e involving the review of an ad-
ministrative pension determination by writ of certiorari under the statute, see
In re Gifford, 192 Wash. 562, 74 P. (2d) 475, 114 A.L.R. 348 (1937).
26 L. '41, ch. 128, § 4.
'7L. '41, ch 1, § 9, discussed at p. 103, infra.28 L. '41, ch. 170, § 4, discussed at p. 103, inlra.
25L. '41, ch. 1, § 9; L. '41, ch. 170, § 4.
o Conant v. State, 197 Wash. 21, 84 P. (2d) 378 (1938).
2L. '41, ch. 1, §§ 8, 9. See discussion at p. 102, infra.
"The Attorney General has ruled, however, that these provisions are not
operative. See discussion at p. 103, inra. If the courts sustain this ruling, the
conflict mentioned in the text will not arise.
"See p. 83, infra.
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presents a different problem, since it may well be that one statute or
the other must give way, the point that was speculated upon above. On
the other hand, here again there would seem to be no compelling reason
why both procedures should not coexist.
The only branches of the public assistance program, then, to which
the general appeal statute clearly and exclusively can apply are the
various programs for aiding needy children.
Assistance for the Blind. Several important changes have been made
in the program of assistance for the needy blind. The legislature adopted
the device of amending the special 1937 statute.34 But as has been
noted,3  this statute was partially repealed by the general statute of
1939.36 Those portions which are now amended are, of course, re-enact-
ed, but what of some of the other sections, e.g., the section vesting the
local administration in the county commissioners as a "local administra-
tive board"?37 Do the provisions of the new amending act imposing
duties and powers upon that "board" operate to revive the general en-
abling section as well? Or does the "board" have only the powers spe-
cifically referred to in the new statute?
Assistance for the Blind - Eligibility. The most important change
hereunder is the liberalization of the definition of "need." Under the
former law38 a blind person was not deemed in need if he had close
relatives residing in the state who were financially able to support him.
This feature has been eliminated as to adult applicants. 39 Moreover,
"small inconsequential sums resulting from casual earnings, unpredict-
able gifts of indeterminate value, and past income that will not con-
tinue in the future shall be disregarded," and "income shall be computed
on the basis of net income."40
A second change is in the residence requirements.41 The word "resi-
dence" is defined in terms of "permanent address," presumably in con-
trast with technical domicil, the residence of one spouse shall not be
a4L. '37, ch. 132.
" See note 12, supra.
3 L. '39, ch. 216.
87L. '37, ch. 132, § 7; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) 10007-5. This was repealed
by the operation of L. '39, ch. 216, §§ 4, 35; Rasm. Rav. STAT. (Supp.) §§ 10007-
104a, 10007-135a.
38 L. '37, ch. 132, § 8(c) ; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-6(c) as impliedly
amended and supplemented by L. '39, ch. 216, § 17; R.Em. REv. STAT. (Supp.)
§ 10007-117a.
89 L. '41, ch. 170, § 1, amending L. '37, ch. 132, § 8(c); Rarir. REv. STAT.
(Supp.) § 10007-6(c); and § 3, specifically superseding L. '39, ch. 216, § 17;
Rarm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-117a, insofar as the latter relates to assist-
ance to the blind.
0 L. '41, ch. 170, § 3.
" Id., § 2. This section purports to amend a section (L. '37, ch. 132, § 9;
Ri, .REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-7) dealing with the proper county in which
to apply for aid, but the language used indicates a broader purpose.
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deemed that of the other unless they are living together,4 2 and the
"residence" of a minor child is to be determined, apparently, by his
mere presence in the state regardless of the residence or domicil of his
parents. 8
A third change provides that eligibility shall not be affected by, tem-
porary presence in a public hospital, employment in a shop maintained
for the blind, or attendance at school or college. 4
Assistance for the Blind-Amount of Assistance. The minimum
standard of aid is reinstated at a sum which together with other income
and, resources of the applicant will be not less than $40.00 per month.4 5
"No person concerned with the administration of [assistance to the
blind] shall dictate how any applicant shall expend the aid granted
him.,,6
The former statute47 authorizing a recovery by the state of all or part
of assistance rendered from the estate of a deceased recipient is repealed
both prospectively and retroactively as to assistance to the blind, except
as to amounts wrongfully received.
48
Assistance for the Blind-Appeals. As we have seen, the legislature
has, wittingly or unwittingly, revived the "local administrative board"
as the bottom rung in the administrative ladder. It shall receive the
application, investigate the facts, and grant or deny the application
within 30 days.4" The conflict with the 1941 statute amending the 1939
general statute has been discussed above.5 0
An aggrieved applicant is given the right to appeal first to the local
administrative board, thence to the Director of Social Security, thence
to the superior court of the county of his residence, thence to the
Supreme Court." The details of procedure are set out rather fully. The
scope of judicial review is limited to an examination of the record made
"For the common law rules, see RESTATEmENT, Cora. or LAWS (1934), §§ 27,
28.
" For the common law rules, see id., §§ 30-39.
"L. '41, ch. 170, § 1, amending L. '37, ch. 132, § 8(e); REM. REv. STAT.
(Supp.) § 10007-6(e).
"5L. '41, ch. 170, §3, amending'L. '37, ch. 132, §10; REMI. REv. STAT.
(Supp.) § 10007-8, which had essentially the same provision, but which was
perhaps superseded by L. '39, ch. 216, §§ 14, 17, 20; REM REv. STAT. (Supp.)
§§ 10007-114a,-117a,-120a. The last section cited uses the "no more than" rather
than the "not less than" approach.
6L. 41, ch. 170, § 5, amending L. '37, ch. 132, § 17; RFzc. REv. STAT.
(Supp.) § 10007-15.
47 L. '39, ch. 216, § 24; REm. RFv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-124a.
18 L. '41, ch. 170, § 6, adding a new section, 16-A, to L. '37, ch. 132.
19L. '41, ch. 170, § 2, amending L. '37, ch. 132, § 9; REM. R v. STAT.(Supp.) § 10007-7. This apparently supersedes the relevant provisions of the
1939 general statute insofar as a period of 45 days was allowed to pass on the
application. L. '39, ch. 216, § 17; REM. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 10007-117a.
" See p. 82, supra.




before the Director or his examiner, and a reversal m'ay be had only
upon a finding that the Director "has been arbitrary or capricious.
5 2
If the applicant's claim is upheld at any stage of the procedure, assist-
ance shall be paid from the time of application.
Aid to Dependent Children. Here again the eligibility requirements
have been liberalized in two respects. The former age limit of 16 years
has been extended to 18 years in case the needy child is regularly
attending school, and it is provided that the upper age limit shall be
18 years in all cases if and when the federal government will match
funds as to such children.53 The residence requirements have been
altered; they now include a child who has resided in the state for one
year, or whose parent or relative with whom he lives has resided in the
state for one year.5 4
Two administrative changes have been made. The Department of
Social Security is now empowered to accept custody of children, and to
provide for the care of children in need of protective services, directly
or by agent.5 The administration of the program of services to crippled
children is now vested in the Director of Health, instead of the Depart-
ment of Social Security, as formerly. JOHN B. SHOLLEY.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
The 1941 legislature made a large number of changes' in the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act, several of them of major importance,
which will be discussed under the appropriate headings below. Following
the legislative practice in 1939, these changes were enacted as amend-
ments to the original act of 1937' as amended in 1939. 3 The original
section numbering has been retained throughout, and the entirely new
matter has been inserted under new subsection headings at appropriate
places.'
62 Id.
53 L. '41, ch. 242, §1, amending L. '37, ch. 114, §1; Rjza. Rlv. STAT.
(Supp.) § 9992-101. The change follows a similar change in the federal standards
in 1939. 53 STAT. 1380.
1 L. '41, ch. 242, § 2, amending L. '37, ch. 114, § 4; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.)
§ 9992-104. The former statute did not cover the child living with a resident
relative other than a parent. It also required that the residence requirements
be "established to the satisfaction of the department of social security," a pro-
vision which might diminish the chances of a successful appeal. This provision
has been deleted.
" L. '41, ch. 242, § 3, amending L. '37, ch. 114, § 6; Rsar. Ryv. STAT,
(Supp.) § 9992-106.
66 L. '41, ch. 129, § 1, amending L. '37, ch. 114, § 7; Ria. Rxv. STAT.
(Supp.) § 9992-107.
'L. '41, ch. 253.
2 L. '37, ch. 162.
-L. '39, ch. 214. L. '39, ch. 12 transferred the administration of the act
from the Department of Social Security to the Commissioner of Unemployment
Compensation and Placement.
'The citations will accordingly be only to the sections of the original act
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General Administrative Provisions. The new statute provides 5 that
the Commissioner shall appoint a State Advisory Council to aid in the
formulation of policy and to assure impartiality and freedom from
political influence in the solution of problems arising under the Act.
The Council shall be composed of equal numbers of employer and em-
ployee representatives, plus members representing the public. Members
are not compensated, except as to expenses incurred and wages lost
because of service.
A major change has been effected in the method of selecting adminis-
trative personnel.6 The Commissioner is required to select all personnel
from registers established by a new agency, the Personnel Board. This
Board is to be of three members appointed by the Governor. The Com-
missioner is further instructed to draft regulations to meet the personnel
standards of the Federal Social Security Board and which will provide
foT the maintenance of the merit system. The Personnel Board is to
compile its registers pursuant to such regulations.7
Under the former statute," the Commissioner was given authority to
enter reciprocal agreements with appropriate agencies of other states or
the federal government to provide for the cases of employees performing
services in more than one siate by allocating such services to one state
or the other for the purpose of calculating potential benefits. The new
statute extends this power to the making of such agreements with
agencies of foreign countries, and imposes some new restrictions upon
the scope of the agreements which may be entered. 9
The Commissioner, as was done in 1939,:0 is ordered to prepare a
report on the operations of the Act with a view to the establishment
of an experience rating system to more equitably fix employer contri-
butions 11 To further this end, the Commissioner is ordered to establish
a system of records showing the contributions of each employer and the
and to the 1939 Supplement to REamvTON'S REVISED STATUTES. The provisions
of the 1937, 1939, and 1941 session laws can be readily found by use of the
original section numbering.
'§ 23 (new). The old § 23 (Rarc. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-123), which
provided for the suspension of the Act should the complementary provisions of
the Federal Social Security Act become inoperative, is repealed. L. '41, ch.
253, § 15. That possibility now seems remote since the constitutionality of the
federal statute has been upheld. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U. S. 548 (1937). See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S.
495 (1937) (holding state unemployment compensation act constitutional).
'§11(e), amending Rxi. Rxv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-111(e). See also the
new § 12(a) deleting from the old statute (Rrzr. Rnv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-
112(a)) the provision as to the appointment of personnel.
'The personnel system so created is made applicable to such other state
agencies and departments as the Governor may designate.
§ 11(b) ; RPrE. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-111(b).
§ 11(b) (3) (new).
10 L. 39, ch. 214, § 5, amending L. '37, ch. 162, § 7(c) (1); REM. REv. STAT.
(Supp.) 9998-107(c) (1).
" § 7(c) (1).
1941]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
benefits paid to his former employees.12
Coverage. The most important change made by the 1941 legislature
in the Unemployment Compensation Act is a great extension of its
coverage. But before analyzing this change, it will be well to outline the
scheme upon which the Act is drafted.
Like a system of mathematics, this statute is an integrated and self-
contained aggregation of rules, built one upon the other, all of which
rules are phrased in certain terms, which in turn are carefully and
artificially defined.'2 Each clause of the statute must be read in the light
of all of the rest of the statute-most particularly in the light of the
definitions. A provision standing alone is not only apt to be unintelligi-
ble, but quite misleading. Thus the whole effect and meaning of the Act
can be altered by changing the definitions of certain key terms.
The two fundamental provisions of the Act are those declaring, re-
spectively, the liability of employers to pay "contributions" and the
eligibility of unemployed persons to receive "benefits." The former
14
provides in substance that contributions are payable by each "em-
ployer" with respect to "wages" payable for "employment." The other
basic section'- provides in substance that an unemployed person is
eligible to receive benefits if within his "base year" he has earned
"wages" of not less than $200 from an "employer." The key words in
these provisions are "employer," "employment," and "wages," all terms
which are artificially defined in the Act. The important changes in the
Act have been effected, not by amending the basic sections, but by
changing the definitions of their terms.
By far the most far-reaching change in the Act was a great expansion
of its coverage. This was done by the simple device of redefining the
term "employer." Formerly an "employer" was a person who employed
eight or more individuals in "employment" in each of twenty or more
weeks in a calendar year. 6 The new statute 7 provides: "'Employer'
§ 7(c) (2) (new). A similar provision in the 1937 act (L. '37, ch. 162,
(c) (1) was repealed in 1939 (L. '39, ch. 214, § 5).
" "As used in this act, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, all terms
specially defined herein shall be given the meaning contained in such definition,
irrespective of the common law or popular meaning of such terms." § 19 (new),
amending REM. REv. STAT. (Supp) § 9998-119 by adding everything following
the second comma. This change is calculated to preclude the courts from re-
sorting to common law concepts and definitions in interpreting the act, as they
did in interpreting the statutory definition of "employment." See Washington
Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939). Cf.
McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938), a decision adopting
the desired method of interpretation.
" § 7(a) (1); RF-m. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-107(a) (1). This subsection
was not amended.
§ 4(e); Raar. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-104(e). This subsection was not
amended. There are numerous conditions and limitations upon the right to
receive benefits. §§ 3, 4, 5; Ram. REv. STAT. (Supp.) §§ 9998-103,-104,-105.
" L. '37, ch. 162, § 19(f) (1); Rai,. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-119.
27 § 19(f) (1) (new). The former provision (cited in preceding note) was
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means: On and after July 1, 1941, any individual or type of organiza-
tion ... which has any person in employment for it or which having
become an employer, has not ceased to be an employer as provided ii
this act."
The first effect of this new definition will be to greatly increase the
number of persons who must pay contributions into the unemployment
compensation fund. Every comer grocer who has a clerk, every physician
who has a nurse, every attorney who has a stenographer, must now fill
out returns and remit contributions. The coverage of the Washington
Unemployment Compensation Act is now the most extensive in the
country." Aside from the financial outlay," however, the added burden
upon the newly covered employers will not be great, since they must
keep payroll records and file returns under the old age pension tax
provisions of the Federal Social Security System.20
The second major effect of the newly enlarged definition of "em-
ployer" will be a great increase in the number of potentially eligible
recipients of benefits. Under the former law only those employed by
employers of eight or more persons could anticipate any protection
during periods of future unemployment, since only they were earning
the "wages" '2 . which were a prerequisite to eligibility.22 After July 1,
all persons in "employment ' 2 will be qualifying for unemployment
compensation. No longer will there be a discrimination between workers
based upon the-to them-largely fortuitous circumstance of the pres-
ence or absence of seven co-workers. The removal of this discrimination
against his employees should, to some extent, offset the new burdens
cast upon the small employer.
The broad new definition of "employer" necessitated certain clari-
fications dand modifications of the, definition of "employment" to re-
move doubts as to the coverage in a number of situations which pre-
re-enacted as § 19(f) (2) to, be in effect only until July 1, 1941. A previous
attempt to expand the coverage of the Act was defeated by veto. L. '39, ch. 214,
§ 16.
"8 The District of Columbia Act has a similar coverage. 49 STAr. 947, § 3 (a).
As of November 1, 1940, there were only ten other jurisdictions whose acts
applied to employers of but one individual, and each of these required either a
minimum period of employment or a minimum total payroll or both. Social
Security Bull. (Nat. Assn. of Mfrs.), Vol. 4, No. 3, supp. (1940).
102.7% of the first $3000 paid to each employee. §§ 7(b) (2), 19(m);
RnF.. REv. STAT. (Supp.) §§ 9998-107(b) (2), -119a (m). Employers of eight
or more individuals must also pay a federal tax of .3% of their payrolls under
the Federal Social Security Act. Int. Rev. Code §§ 1600, 1601(a), 1607(a),
reenacting 49 STAT. 639, 9H 901, 902, 907.
20 Int. Rey. Code § 1410, reenacting 49 STAT. 637, § 804.
"" 'Wages' means the first three thousand dollars of remuneration payable
by one employer to an individual worker for employment during any calendar
year." § 19(m); Rnvr. Rxv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-119a(m) (italics added).
22 See section cited in note 15, supra, and text thereabove.
" This term is given a much narrower definition than its ordinary one.
§ 19(g); RE Rav. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-119a(g). See p. 88, infra, for a discussion
of amendments to this subsection.
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viously were clearly excluded by the former "eight employees for twenty
weeks" definition of "employer." For example, the new definition of
('employer" standing alone would cover the hiring of a painter to paint
a dwelling, or a neighbor boy to wash an automobile. This possibility
has been eliminated by introducing a new exception in the definition
of "employment," that of "casual labor," which is defined as "labor not
in the course of the employer's trade or business (labor which does
not promote or advance the trade or business of the employer) .1'24
Nevertheless, many persons are liable under the literal language of the
Act who would never regard themselves as "employers." For example,
what of a professor who hires a stenographer for a week to type the
manuscript of a textbook he is preparing for publication? It would seem
that a minimum total payroll requirement would be an appropriate
addition to the definition of "employer."25
The new statute amplifies and probably expands the definition of
"agricultural labor," the most important exception to "employment."
The old law defined "agricultural labor" as "services customarily per-
formed by a farm hand on a farm for the owner or tenant of a farm." 26
The term now includes all services in the cultivation and handling of
crops, the preparation, packing and delivery of such crops in their
natural state to storage, to market, or to a carrier, the care of livestock,
and maintenance of the farm.27
The term "employment" is further curtailed in scope by the new
provision that no part of the services performed by an individual for
an employer during a pay period shall be deemed "employment" if more
than one-half of such services during such period are not "employ-
ment."2 This will permit the employer of "agricultural labor" or
domestic help2" to use such help temporarily in the course of a covered
business or occupation without liability to make contributions.
The last key term, "wages," has also been partially redefined. It no
longer includes payments made to employees under general plans in
cases of retirement, disability, or death, payment of federal social
security taxes levied upon employees, dismissal payments, and unearned
24 § 19(g) (6) (xiii) (new).
2 The 1939 act redefined "employer" as one who had one or more persons
in employment in each of twenty weeks, with a payroll of at least $100 during
one calendar quarter. This provision was vetoed. L. '39, ch. 214, § 16, amend-
ing L. '37, ch. 162, § 19(f). This is the prevailing type of coverage definition.
See note 18, supra.
28 § 19(g) (6) (i); REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-119a(g) (6) (i).
27§ 19(g) (6) (i) (new). See also § 19(g) (6) (xi) (new), excluding from
"employment" services rendered in the raising of mushrooms. Services in com-
mercial canning or freezing operations are not "agricultural labor" under the
former subsection.
28 § 19(g) (6) (xii) (new). Conversely, if more than half of the services
are "employment," then all are deemed to be.




payments to employees while in military service.80 The legislature thus
has ceased to discourage employers' generosity as it did when a sub-
stantial tax was levied upon its exercise.
Eligibility for Benefits. The changes made in these sections are nearly
all merely clarifying in effect. The condition that the unemployed per-
son be "available for work" to be eligible for benefits 31 has been ampli-
fied; he must now be "ready, able and willing immediately to accept
any suitable work which may be offered to him and must be actively
seeking work," and he must be "able and available for work in his
usual trade or occupation." 32 The individual who voluntarily quits work
for personal reasons, such as marriage, pregnancy, or removal to a new
locality, is declared to be "unavailable" until he has thereafter earned
"wages" of fifty dollars and has been employed in four calendar weeks."'
A new ground for disqualification has been created: the making of
false statements to obtain benefits.3 4
Benefit Claims-Procedure. A few changes have been made in the
elaborate and detailed provisions85 for the determination of claims for
benefits and the review thereof. The sequence of initial determination,
appeal to an appeal tribunal, review by the Commissioner, and appeal
to the courts has been modified in two respects. The Commissioner is
now authorized on his own motion to "reconsider" an initial determina-
tion prior to any appeal wherever he finds an error in computation or
the like, or that wages of the claimant have been newly discovered.38
Under the old law,. the Commissioner on his own motion could review
the decision of an appeal tribunal or might "permit any of the parties
to such decision to initiate. further appeal. 3 7 The latter cryptic clause
has been eliminated and the commissioner now "shall" affirm, modify or
set aside any decision of an appeal tribunal upon petition of any inter-
ested party.38 Certain unimportant changes in the subsection 9 govern-
ing [the making of] initial determinations have also been made.
30§ 19(g) (m) (1), -(2), -(3), -(4) (new).
§ 4c; REm. Rzv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-104(c).
Id, as amended. The same subsection also provides that a student shall
not be excluded if he may discontinue study at any time with a refund of tuition
and the opportunity to resume his study at any time where he left off. The
clear inference is that a student attending a public school, college, or university,
is not "available."
"Id. This situation was formerly 'treated as creating -a disqualification,
§ 5(c); REm. Rv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-105(c). This subsection has been
deleted.
" § 5(c) (new). The disqualification may continue from one to twenty-six
weeks, as the Commissioner may determine.
"§ 6; R x-. RFv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-106.
'e § 6(b), amending Rlr. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-106(b).
"§ 6(e); REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-106(e).
:8 Id., as amended.
' § 6(b), amending REm. R.v. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-106(b).
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The former statutory provision 40 in respect to fees and costs was
interpreted to require a claimant to pay docket fees in the superior court
upon taking an appeal thereto.4 This result has been obviated for the
future by deleting the proviso upon which the court relied. 42 The new
statute permits an attorney or agent representing a claimant before an
administrative tribunal to charge such fee as the officer in charge of the
proceeding shall find to be reasonable.43 Under the old law such a repre-
sentative could apparently charge no fee at all.
Collection of Contributions. The methods of collecting contributions
from employers have been greatly increased in variety and efficacy.
Under the old law, pressure to avoid delinquency was imposed by an
"interest" charge of 1% per month; delinquent contributions and in-
terest could be collected by civil action; and contributions due and
accruing were made a prior lien upon the assets of any employer in the
process of distribution through insolvency or probate proceedings.. 4
These provisions have been reenacted in essentially unchanged form.45
A new and potent sanction has been created to put pressure upon
employers to avoid delinquency. A delinquent employer may now be
enjoined from "continuing in business in this state or employing persons
herein until the contributions and interest shall have been paid, or until
the employer shall have furnished" a bond in double the amount of
estimated contributions for the ensuing year to secure the payment of
such contributions.
46
An entirely new method of compulsory collection, which minimizes
the role of the courts to the utmost, has been provided. After he finds
that a contribution has become delinquent,4" the Commissioner may
issue a notice of assessment specifying the amount due which shall be
served upon the employer in the same manner as are summons in a
civil action.4 8 The employer so served with notice of assessment has ten
'o § 15(b) ; R~as. Rav. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-115(b).
,' State ex rel. Wilson v. King County, 107 Wash. Dec. 25, 109 P. (2d) 291
(1941).
42§ 15(b), amending REM. PEv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-115(b).
43 d.
' § 14; R1sx. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-114. The three provisions appear as
subsections (a), (b), and (c) respectively.
" § 14. These provisions reappear as subsections (a), (k), and (m) re-
spectively.
" § 14(j). The use of the disjunctive "or" in laying down the conditions
terminating the injunction creates an ambiguity. May the court impose both
conditions, or either alone? It would seem that payment of delinquent con-
tributions should be a mandatory condition, while posting the bond might
properly be discretionary.
"' A notice of assessment may be issued before delinquency if the Commis-
sioner has reason to believe the employer insolvent. § 14(h) (new).
41§ 14(c) (new). If the employer cannot be found within the state, service
may be made by registered mail to his last known address. If the employer has
failed to return the required reports, the commissioner may "arbitrarily" do so,
which reports shall be prima facie correct. § 14(g) (new).
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days in which to file a petition with the Commissioner stating his objec-
tions to the assessment and the grounds thereof. The issues thus raised
shall be heard by an appeal tribunal as are appeals from the initial
determination of benefit claims, and the same procedure in respect to
review by the Commissioner and the courts is followed.49 Should the
petitioner fail to have the assessment set aside, it may be enforced by
the distraint proceedings discussed below.
A similar procedure has been introduced to pass upon petitions for
refunds of contributions paid. The Commissioner may order a refund
if he finds that error has been committed, but if he denies the petition
he must notify the employer in writing, whereupon the latter has ten
days within which to file a petition for a hearing, and the procedure
thereafter is the same as in the case of petitions objecting to assess-
ments."'
The failure of an employer to fie a petition within ten days after
the service of a notice of assessment subjects him to serious conse-
quences. First, the assessment "shall be conclusively deemed to be just
and correct" 5 ---presumably in all subsequent proceedings whatsoever.
This is a drastic provision indeed in light of the short period allowed to
frame a defense and file a petition.5 2
The second effect of the failure to file a petition for hearing within
the allotted time-unless, of course, the assessment is paid-is to sub-
ject all the goods and property of the employer, except such as may be
exempt from the levy of execution, to distraint by the Commissioner.5
A public sale is then held and the seized property is sold. 54 The pur-
chaser at-such sale acquires all the interest of the employer in the
property, 55 and the bill of sale or deed is conclusive evidence of the
regularity of the sale procedure and prima facie evidence of te right
of the Commissioner to make the sale.5
" § 14(e) (new). The procedure on benefit claims is set out in § 6, amending
REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-106. See p. 89, supra. The scope of judicial
review is apparently limited to questions of law. § 6(i).
§ 14(f), amending former § 14(d); R~xs. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-114(d).
' § 14(e) (new). A similar result follows the failure to file a petition for
hearing within ten days of receiving notice of the denial of a petition for a
refund. § 14(f) (new).52Want of time and space precludes a' discussion of the constitutionality of -
the new procedures.
:'§ 14(c) (new).
' § 14(d) (new). The sale is conducted by the Commissioner, and he issues
the necessary deeds and bills of sale. There is no resort to a court at any stage
of the distraint procedure, nor is there a hearing of any kind.55 Id. Apparently, a distraint sale does not cut off the rights of mortgagees,
pledgees, etc. Compare the effect of the lien foreclosure proceeding discussed
below at p. 92.
56 § 14(d) (new). The last provision presumably refers to the regularity of
the procedural steps prior to the distraint, e.g., the service of the notice of
assessment upon the employer, and to the existence of defenses to the right to
distrain, e.g., the filing of a petition by the employer within ten days. As has
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The third new weapon in the Commissioner's arsenal is a lien upon
all of the "property and rights to property" of a delinquent employer.5 7
This lien attaches automatically upon delinquency, dates back to the
beginning of the contribution period, and is declared to be prior to all
other liens except prior tax liens. It is, however, invalid against any
purchaser, mortgagee, pledgee, or judgment creditor until notice thereof
has been filed with the Secretary of State." This creates a new hazard
for mortgagees and purchasers, and one which will be very difficult to
guard against, because of the retroactive effect of the new lien and the
inconvenient method provided for its discovery. The legislative purpose
would seem to be to induce private lienors and purchasers to pay the
delinquent contributions. The new lien is to be foreclosed in connection
with an action in a civil suit to collect delinquent contributions. 9
There is one important gap in the coverage of the new lien. It is
ineffective as against purchasers, mortgagees, or pledgees for value with-
out actual notice, of money, negotiable instruments, or "securities.180
The legislature has increased the efficacy of these new collection
methods by the inclusion of two important provisions. On the one hand,
the Commissioner may proceed by any or all methods at once; he can
bring distraint proceedings, sue to collect and foreclose the lien, and
sue to enjoin further conduct of business, all simultaneously.6' On the
other hand, the employer is precluded from taking the initiative. The
statute provides that "no court shall entertain any action to enjoin an
assessment or require a refund," and that "matters which may be de-
termined by the procedures herein set out shall not be the subject of
any declaratory judgment. 812 The latter provision is of particular sig-
nificance because the "matters" mentioned includes everything that
affects the validity of an assessment, and that covers about everything
that an employer could litigate anyway, and because in the past em-
ployers have used the declaratory judgment procedure successfully to
been seen, no attack upon the merits of the assessment itself can be made.
"
7 § 14(b) (new).
" This provision is puzzling. It is true that the discovery of a filed lien will
warn prospective mortgagees, etc., but, if the lien is prior whenever filed, the
absence of any filing is no protection whatsoever to such persons. If so, why
require the filing at all? And what of a purchaser who buys a chattel from
the employer prior to any delinquency-will the lien "date back" and attach to the
chattel? If so, who would be safe in buying anything from any merchant?
All in all, it looks like the Supreme Court will have a number of nice questions
to answer.
" § 14(k), amending § 14(b) ; Rxai. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-114(b).
Apparently there is no right of redebnption after such foreclosure.
0 § 14(b) (new). "Securities" are evidences of indebtedness issued by any
governmental agency or private corporation, stock certificates, interim certificates,
etc.
.1§ 14(l) (new). The remedies are declared to be "cumulative," and no
choice of remedy shall be deemed an exclusive election.
62 § 14(i) (new).
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forestall an administrative determination of questions of coverage, there-
by avoiding the presumption of the validity of administ ative action. 3
The only real remedy left open to the employer is a resort to the
administrative-judicial procedure initiated either by petition objecting
to a notice of assessment, or by prompt payment followed by a petition
for refund. And there are dangerous pitfalls here. Because of the finality
accorded to an unanswered notice of assessment as noted above, an
employer who pays after ten days from its receipt is precluded from
securing a refund. He must either pay before notice" or petition
promptly after notice. The former alternative is more satisfactory from
one standpoint, since it gives the employer three years in which to frame
his objections, 5 instead of only ten days. Hence the net effect of the
new provisions may be to induce employers to pay first and litigate
later, which is no doubt exactly what the legislature intended.
joHN B. SHOLLEY.
"' State ex rel. Ernst v. Superior Court, 198 Wash. 133, 87 P. (2d) 294 (1939);
Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
"
4Payment within the ten day period apparently does not prevent the
assessment from becoming conclusive. See § 14(e) (new).
" § 14(f), amending § 14(d); Rm . Rxv. STAT. (Supp.) § 9998-114(d).
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